IT

Tracker / CVE-2025-38499

CVE-2025-38499

High 7.8

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: clone_private_mnt(): make sure that caller has CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the right userns What we want is to verify there is that clone won't expose something hidden by a mount we wouldn't be able to undo. "Wouldn't be able to undo" may be a result of MNT_LOCKED on a child, but it may also come from lacking admin rights in the userns of the namespace mount belongs to. clone_private_mnt() checks the former, but not the latter. There's a number of rather confusing CAP_SYS_ADMIN checks in various userns during the mount, especially with the new mount API; they serve different purposes and in case of clone_private_mnt() they usually, but not always end up covering the missing check mentioned above.

Affected products and versions

debian debian_linux
linux linux_kernel
linux linux_kernel · 4.14.244 → 4.15
linux linux_kernel · 4.19.204 → 4.20
linux linux_kernel · 4.4.281 → 4.5
linux linux_kernel · 4.9.280 → 4.10
linux linux_kernel · 5.10.59 → 5.11
linux linux_kernel · 5.13.11 → 5.14
linux linux_kernel · 5.14.1 → 5.15.190
linux linux_kernel · 5.16 → 6.1.147
linux linux_kernel · 5.4.141 → 5.5
linux linux_kernel · 6.13 → 6.15.3
linux linux_kernel · 6.2 → 6.6.100
linux linux_kernel · 6.7 → 6.12.40

Analysis

This page is not indexable yet.Until it carries original analysis — what it actually exposes, how to check in two minutes whether a system was touched, what to do if it was — the page stays noindex. The database decides that, not the template.

References